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THE ECONOMIC PAY-OFFS TO INFORMAL TRAINING: 
EVIDENCE FROM ROUTINE SERVICE WORK 
XIANGMIN LIU and ROSEMARY BATT* 
This study examines the relationship between informal training and job performance 
among 2,803 telephone operators in a large unionized U.S. telecommunications com 
pany. The authors analyze individual-level data on monthly training hours and job 
performance over a five-month period in 2001 as provided by the company's electronic 
monitoring system. The results indicate that the receipt of informal training was as 
sociated with higher productivity over time, when unobserved individual heterogene 
ity is taken into account. Workers with lower pre-training proficiency showed greater 
improvements over time than did those with higher pre-training proficiency. Finally, 
whether the trainer was a supervisor or a peer also mattered: workers with below-average 
pre-training proficiency achieved greater productivity gains through supervisor train 
ing, while workers with average pre-training proficiency achieved greater productivity 
gains through peer training. 
In 
recent decades, skill requirements for 
many jobs have increased due to height 
ened international 
competition, techno 
logical change, and customer expectations. 
Employers who are investing in new work 
processes and technology expect workers to 
produce error-free output at higher levels of 
efficiency than in the past. Thus, the need 
for ongoing training has risen even though 
competitive pressures put constraints on 
training budgets. 
*Xiangmin Liu is a Ph.D. student in Human Resource 
Studies, and Rosemary Batt is the Alice H. Cook Professor 
of Women and Work, both at the School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations, Cornell University. This study was 
funded by the Russell Sage Foundation. The authors 
thank John Bishop, Jed DeVaro, and Martin Wells for 
comments and suggestions. 
Copies of the computer programs used to generate 
the results in this paper are available through Rosemary 
Batt at ILR School, 387 Ives Hall, Cornell University, 
Ithaca, NY 14853. Phone: 607-254-4437; fax: 607-255 
1836; e-mail: rb41@cornell.edu. 
Informal or on-the-job training provides 
an effective and efficient way to satisfy the 
demand for skill in 
organizations character 
ized by continuous change in technology 
and competition. It allows new employees 
to acquire firm-specific skills and knowl 
edge that are hard to obtain in the market, 
while allowing incumbent employees to stay 
abreast of changes in technical systems and 
product offerings. Context-specific learn 
ing also reduces the losses associated with 
transferring learning from off-site to on-site 
applications. Moreover, compared to formal 
classroom training, informal training is less 
costly because it reduces productivity loss 
associated with time away from work and 
saves 
expenditures associated with training 
specialists and materials. Because it can be 
integrated into daily work schedules, it also 
provides greater flexibility than traditional, 
off-the-job training. In sum, informal train 
ing can yield substantial economic pay-offs to 
companies through the ongoing skill acqui 
sition of employees. Yet, the overwhelming 
bulk of training research has focused on 
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formal training (Bishop 1997; Frazis and 
Loewenstein 2005). 
The present study contributes to the train 
ing literature in several ways. First, we focus on 
an important but relatively neglected subject 
in the training literature?informal training 
rather than formal training, and incumbent 
workers rather than new hires. Second, we 
develop and test a model of productivity 
that includes the effects of training as well 
as its depreciation rate. The identification 
of depreciation rates allows us to estimate 
the payoff period of informal training and, 
therefore, the returns on human capital in 
vestments. Third, we use archival data from 
a firm-level computerized monitoring system 
to measure informal training hours and pro 
ductivity for individual employees. Relatively 
few studies have examined rates of return to 
informal training, due in part to the difficulty 
of measuring it. The longitudinal nature of 
the data enables us to use first-difference 
models to control for unmeasured individual 
heterogeneity. Fourth, we integrate insights 
from 
organizational behavior to conceptual 
ize how organizational contingencies and 
individual differences in employees and 
trainers affect training outcomes. That is, 
we examine how employees with different 
levels of capability respond to training in 
general and to supervisor versus peer trainers 
in particular. Finally, we focus on training 
in routine service jobs, specifically directory 
assistance telephone operators. If informal 
training has economic pay-offs in this context, 
it is likely to have even more benefits for jobs 
with greater skill requirements and opportu 
nities for independent judgment. 
Research on Training and Productivity 
Prior research has defined two categories 
of firm-specific training: formal training 
and informal (on-the-job) training. Formal 
training typically includes a standardized 
curriculum provided by an instructor away 
from the job, although companies are in 
creasingly delivering formal training through 
computer-based programs. Informal training 
occurs in the context of daily work and has 
been defined to include three types: a) time 
spent watching co-workers do thejob; b) time 
spent in individualized training or feedback 
with supervisors at work; and c) time spent in 
individualized training or feedback with co 
workers at work (Employment Opportunities 
Pilot Program 1979-80). The current study 
focuses on the latter two types of training. 
Most 
empirical research on employer-pro 
vided training has focused on formal rather 
than informal training, despite the fact that 
an estimated two-thirds of the U.S. workforce 
receives informal training at work (Altonji 
and Spletzer 1991; Frazis et al. 1998). Em 
pirical studies of formal training are based 
on large sample surveys (Holzer et al. 1993; 
Bartel 1994; Black and Lynch 1996; Barrett 
and O'Connell 2001) and econometric case 
studies (Bartel 1995; Krueger and Rouse 
1998). Studies using large sample survey 
data have shown positive effects of training, 
but suffer from measurement error that is 
substantially reduced in the econometric case 
studies (see Bartel 2000 for a review). 
More relevant to the current 
study are 
analyses of informal training. Most are 
based on national-level surveys and examine 
workers in the first three months after hire 
(for example, Bishop 1991; Barron, Berger, 
and Black 1997b). Bishop's (1991) study 
analyzing the 1982 Employment Opportu 
nity Pilot Projects (EOPP) included formal 
training and three types of informal training: 
learning by watching, informal training with 
supervisors, and informal training with co 
workers. He found that the marginal rate 
of return for 100 hours of training ranged 
from 11% to 38%, depending on estimation 
techniques and type of training. Moreover, 
the amount of formal and informal train 
ing had very similar effects on productivity 
growth during the first year of employment. 
This implies that informal training, which 
is lower in cost than formal training, had 
higher marginal returns. In a second study, 
Bishop (1994) found that employer training 
raised both wages and productivity. Invest 
ments in training appeared profitable for 
employers because productivity gains were 
greater than wage growth. In these studies, 
job performance was measured on a 0-100 
scale, as reported by employers. 
Barron, Berger, and Black (1997b) inves 
tigated the effects of informal training on 
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wages, turnover, and productivity using three 
different data sources: the EOPP 1982 data, 
a 1992 Small Business Administration survey, 
and their own 1993 survey sponsored by the 
Upjohn Institute. Their findings were similar 
to those of Bishop regarding the value of 
informal training. They also demonstrated 
the extent of measurement error in national 
training surveys by comparing differences in 
training measures across surveys and by com 
paring matched-pairs of responses of work 
ers and employers on the extent of training 
(Barron, Berger, and Black 1997a). 
These studies based on national surveys 
provide the strongest evidence to date that 
informal training has economic benefits. 
However, they have several methodological 
problems. They use either job tenure as a 
proxy for informal training or estimates of 
training hours in national surveys; reports by 
employers and employees vary considerably; 
and productivity is reported by employers on 
a 
subjective scale. 
In sum, while economic theory provides 
a general argument for why investments 
in informal training should lead to better 
performance via its effect on human capital, 
empirical studies are few and limited by mea 
surement problems. Moreover, aside from 
the general proposition that investment in 
firm-specific training should improve per 
formance, economic theory provides little 
guidance for theorizing about how, why, or 
under what conditions 
employer-provided 
training may have differentiated outcomes. 
Informal Training as Information 
Processing and Continuous Learning 
To improve our understanding of how 
informal training affects productivity, we 
examined variation in 
organizational con 
tingencies that may shape the effectiveness 
of training. Two important factors are the 
levels of worker proficiency and task com 
plexity. Ackerman (1987), for example, 
argued that the effectiveness of training for 
employees with different levels of ability 
depends importantly on the level of informa 
tion processing that tasks require. For novel 
tasks requiring sophisticated information 
processing, he found that individuals with 
high levels of intellectual capability gained 
more from training than did those with lower 
capabilities. In this context, training will 
tend to accentuate the differences between 
employees with higher and lower capabili 
ties. This line of argument is consistent with 
the economic studies 
showing that better 
educated workers are more likely to receive 
formal training and to benefit from it (for 
example, Frazis, Hertz, and Horrigan 1995; 
Bartel 1995; Bishop 1997). 
By contrast, for simple information-process 
ing jobs, Ackerman found that the relation 
ship between training and performance was 
influenced more by psychomotor differences 
(for example, speed of encoding or respond 
ing) than by general cognitive abilities. With 
sufficient training and practice, the less profi 
cient trainees in his study learned specific task 
behaviors, and their performance approached 
that of more proficient employees. Thus, in 
the context of relatively simple information 
processing?like that found in this study and in 
most routine service work?the same amount 
of training should produce greater improve 
ments in performance for less proficient 
workers than for the more proficient. 
Beyond the issue of individual tasks and 
competencies is the question of how the inter 
actions between different types of trainers and 
employees affect outcomes. Recent research 
on situated learning provides some direction 
here, as it views learning as influenced by the 
context in which it occurs, including social 
relationships and the way work is organized 
(Lave and Wenger 1991). By extension, 
informal training constitutes an example of 
situated learning in which the learner, the 
supervisor, and other workers influence the 
process and outcomes (Lave and Wenger 
1991; Brown and Duguid 1991). In addition, 
because informal training occurs in the con 
text of daily work routines and practices, it 
typically does not include the kind of pre-de 
termined curriculum found in formal train 
ing. Its effectiveness depends importantly 
on the characteristics and capabilities of the 
learner and the trainer; differences in status 
or power between the trainer and trainee; 
and how these factors interact. An important 
distinction in this regard is whether trainers 
are 
supervisors or experienced co-workers. 
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Supervisors and workers differ in several 
respects?in the content of their knowledge, 
in their approach to training, in their ability 
to motivate learning?and these differences 
should make them more or less effective as 
trainers for different groups of workers. 
Supervisors have knowledge of job-related 
rules, procedures, and performance require 
ments, but lack tacit knowledge of the job 
that workers perform. In the current envi 
ronment of rapidly changing work processes 
and technologies, even supervisors promoted 
from production-level jobs experience rapid 
decay in their knowledge of day-to-day work 
processes. Given their knowledge base, they 
tend to transform informal training into a 
structured set of learning activities, using 
company manuals, standardized training ma 
terials, and follow-up observations. Swanson, 
O'Connor, and Cooney (1990) suggested that 
low-ability learners tend to gain more from 
highly structured learning environments 
than do high-ability learners. Supervisors 
also rely on their disciplinary authority to 
motivate effort; and less proficient workers 
are more vulnerable to 
reprimand for poor 
performance than 
are more proficient work 
ers. For these reasons, supervisors are likely 
to be more effective than peers in training less 
proficient workers. In other words, supervi 
sor-provided training should result in larger 
performance gains for less-proficient workers 
than for 
more-proficient workers. 
Peer trainers, by contrast, are experienced 
workers, or "subject matter experts," who 
provide assistance and share knowledge with 
co-workers through informal instructional 
activities. They accumulate tacit knowledge 
of work processes and idiosyncratic job 
characteristics that supervisors do not have. 
This kind of knowledge does not lend itself 
to structured learning activities, but is more 
likely to be conveyed through knowledge 
sharing or in the context of specific problems 
or tasks. In addition, as peers do not have 
any disciplinary authority 
over co-workers, 
they can draw on trust, persuasion, or social 
influence to intrinsically motivate learning 
(Bandura 1977). Trust facilitates coopera 
tion, and where unions are present, solidar 
istic behavior among co-workers is likely to 
be stronger. Doeringer and Piore (1971) 
provided similar arguments in their analysis of 
internal labor markets and customary norms 
that shaped skill acquisition between more 
and less 
experienced workers. However, peer 
training is limited because it is incidental 
and emergent in nature, and may even be 
inconsistent across work shifts or trainers. 
Therefore, workers who already have a good 
command of the job are more likely to benefit 
from peer-provided training than are those 
with less job proficiency. 
To summarize our arguments, we expect 
that informal training will be associated with 
better performance, and in the context of 
routine information-processing tasks, we ex 
pect that the relationship between informal 
training and performance will be stronger 
for workers with lower levels of proficiency 
than for workers with higher proficiency. Fi 
nally, we expect that the interactions between 
different types of trainers and trainees will 
produce differentiated results, with supervi 
sor training more effective for less proficient 
workers and peer training more effective for 
more proficient workers. 
Model Specification 
A worker's human capital stock is affected 
by the amount of time devoted to training. 
As informal training encompasses a good 
amount of unstructured, context-specific 
knowledge, workers are likely to forget some 
acquired information over time; and some 
learning becomes obsolete with changes in 
technology and work processes. Therefore, 
worker ?'s stock of human 
capital at month 
t (as denoted by STK_HC.) is given by the 
acquired informal training during month 
t (as denoted by OJT.) plus the existing 
stock that a worker possessed in the previous 
period (STK_HC.t_7), minus what may have 
depreciated during the period, 
n >STK_HC. t_v 
r\ being the depreciation rate. Thus, the 
function of human capital stock (STK_HC.) 
can be written as 
(1) STK_HCit=OJTit + 
(1-Ti) * STK_HCit_r 
By substituting recursively, equation (1) 
can be reduced to 
(2) STK HC t = 2C>JT * (1-n)'-*. / i,t ^ J i,k 
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Following prior training studies (Frazis and 
Loewenstein 2005), we assume that a worker's 
job performance is a logarithmic function of 
past investments in human capital through 
informal training. Therefore, worker ?'s 
job performance at time t (PERF.) can be 
expressed by the function 
(3) \n(PERFit) 
= ? * \n(STK_HC) + 
where \i. is a vector of person-specific char 
acteristics assumed to have a time-invariant 
effect on performance and v.( is a zero 
mean error term, independent of training 
variables. 
By substituting equation (2) into equation 
(3), we obtain the function of a worker's job 
performance, 
(4) IniPERF^ = ? * In(2 O?"ik * (1 -r\)") 
Because a large portion of \i. are unobserv 
able, we use a first-difference estimation of 
equation (4) to reduce errors due to omitted 
variables. In this formulation, all time-invari 
ant effects drop out of the equation, leaving 
only time-varying factors. The first-difference 
transformation results in equation (5): 
(5) \n(PERFh) 
- 
\n(PERFitl) = 
?*(ln(2oyT.A*(l-T|)^) 
-\n(?0fTtk*(l-r)y-k-i)) 
Returns to training may vary among work 
ers of different levels of job proficiency. To 
develop the test for individual differences 
prior to training, we sort workers into three 
groups according to their pre-training job 
competency (low, average, or high). Then we 
estimate equation (5) for each group to test 
the relationship between informal training 
and performance. 
Next, we decompose training into training 
provided by supervisors ( OJT_SUP. ) and by 
experienced peers (OJT_PEER.() in order 
to examine the effects of different types of 
informal training. Therefore equation (5) 
can be extended to 
(6) In (PERFit) 
- In (PERFttl) 
= 
?j* In(2 OJT_SUPik* (1-ti)^ 
- 2 OJT_SUPik * ( 1 
- n )<?1 ) 
+ ?2 
* In(2 OJT_PEERik * (1 
- 
n)l~k 
- 2 OfT_PEERb 
* (1 - ti)'-*1) 
Equations (5) and (6) can be estimated 
by non-linear least squares regressions. Our 
model specification has three advantages. 
First, the logarithmic specification captures 
the diminishing productivity returns of train 
ing. Second, first-difference models elimi 
nate omitted variable bias due to unobserved 
person-specific effects. Finally, the use of 
non-linear least squares regression allows us 
to estimate the depreciation rate parameter 
from available data. 
As suggested by Bartel (2000), accurate 
measures of return on investments (ROI) 
in employee training can guide employers' 
decisions 
regarding human capital invest 
ments. Because informal training incurs little 
expenditure associated with the purchase of 
training materials, we assume that costs only 
arise from the 
separation from production of 
a worker and a trainer. If the 
monthly wage 
of a worker is 
wQ and that of a trainer is w 
and they work //hours each month, then the 
costs of t hours of training are 
w? + wt 
(7) CoStS = 
-^y-^- 
* t. 
The benefits of training are the productiv 
ity gains that training produces. In the con 
text of call centers in this study, productivity 
was measured in terms of seconds per call, or 
call handling time (CHT). Lower seconds 
per call equals higher productivity. Consider 
that call handling time is CHTQ hours prior 
to training and that one hour's training is 
associated with a 6 hour reduction in call 
length. After t hours of training, call handling 
time reduces to CHTQ 
- 6 * tin the present 
month, implying that a worker completes 
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CHTH_Q*t calls in this month, as compared to 
-?~- calls in the absence of training. There 
fore, the productivity gains of t hours from 
training in this month are 
wo I H ? ) HT! H *\CHT0-Q*t CHTJ * (C//T0-0 * ?), 
wQ* 0 * t 
which reduces to CHT?. As training ef 
fects depreciate at a monthly rate of Y) over 
time, productivity gains in the kth month are 
. w * 0 * t* (1 -r\)k . 
equal to ?-. Assuming that n CHT ? 
the employee quit rate is q, the accumulated 
benefits due to t hours of training are 
w' * 6 * t 
(8) Benefits = CHT + 
wn 
* 0 * t* (1 -n) * (1 - q) ?- + ... + 
CHTa 
w0* 9 
* t* (1 -Ti)10 * (1 - q)" 
CHT0 
w? * 0 * , 
CHT0*(r\ + q-t]*q) 
' 
Therefore, the return on investments is 
given by 
(9) ROI=Benef,t?-J?StS 
wn* 0 * t 
CHT0*(r) + q-r)*q) 
^ 
(w0+ w) * t 
H 
w0 * 0 * H 
(w0 + w) * CHT0 * (T) + q- 7] * q) 
Data 
Research Strategy and Sample 
The research site for this study is the 
telephone directory services division of a 
large unionized telecommunications com 
pany operating in a multi-state region of the 
United States. The focal occupational group 
(telephone operators) is the largest group of 
non-managerial employees in the business. 
By focusing on one occupational group in one 
company (Batt 1999) we reduce confound 
ing error caused by factors such as business 
and human resource strategy, technology, 
selection criteria, and work processes. The 
presence of the union further standardizes 
such practices as pay rates, job posting and 
bidding, and grievance procedures across 
the multi-state area. 
Our field research provided insights into 
business 
operations, competitive pressures, 
the skill requirements of jobs, and how and 
why informal training might be useful in this 
context. The business in this case handles 
directory assistance inquiries from anywhere 
in the United States. Calls do not vary dra 
matically in content, and individual operator 
centers do not specialize in any particular 
type of call. Government-mandated service 
levels 
require the company to answer each 
call within 6 seconds, with a compliance rate 
of at least 97.5%. In addition, cost competi 
tion is intense in this commodity market, 
and companies can save millions of dollars 
by reducing call handling time by fractions of 
a second. This can be accomplished either 
through new technologies (for example, voice 
recognition systems process portions of each 
call) or better work skills (for example, more 
efficient search strategies). The company also 
requires an 85% customer satisfaction rating, 
as measured by an outside vendor survey. 
High levels of automation allow operators 
to handle over 1,000 calls per day, with an 
average call handling time (the average time 
to complete a call) of 21.37 seconds (based 
on our archival data). As soon as one call has 
ended, a second one enters the operator's 
headset, based on an automated call distribu 
tion system that assigns calls to the next avail 
able 
operator. Thus, the automated system 
should result in a random assignment of calls 
to workers; and managers we interviewed 
measured 
employee performance on the 
assumption that it did. These jobs are highly 
stressful, according to industry analysts and 
managers interviewed for this study. 
The knowledge and skill requirements of 
the job are of four types: a) basic keyboard 
ing, b) technical and procedural knowledge, 
c) social interaction skills, and d) substantive 
knowledge. According to our interview re 
sults, initial training focuses on the first two 
areas, ensuring that new hires have accurate 
and efficient keyboarding skills and know the 
procedures for retrieving information from a 
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variety of databases. The company provides 
an average of 2.1 weeks of initial training, 
and it takes employees about six months to 
become proficient on the job, according to 
our survey of a stratified random sample of 
773 workers and their supervisors. 
The company engages in several types 
of informal training activities. The most 
common form of training occurs through 
monthly performance reviews, 
as the 
company requires supervisors to provide 
individualized feedback to employees after 
listening remotely to their calls (typically 20 
calls in a month). The employee is rated on 
efficiency standards such as initial start time 
of less than 4 seconds, number of searches 
per call less than 2.5, operator report time 
(scanning, giving options) less than 12 sec 
onds, and release to audio at least 87% of the 
time (avoiding the need to read the number 
by having the system give it). Service quality 
is measured by such items as tone of voice, 
listening to questions carefully and answering 
them 
accurately, and degree of professional 
ism. Substantive knowledge is captured by 
the percentage of calls transferred to a more 
experienced operator (service assistant), 
which can be no more than 3%. In sum, 
these customized sessions provide specific 
guidance for improvement. 
Beyond individualized performance re 
views, the company uses work time to train 
workers in several areas: methods (new 
procedures for call handling or information 
processing), customer satisfaction (ways to 
improve service quality), district issues (busi 
ness-specific information), performance 
improvement activities, and ergonomics. 
Both supervisors and peers provide these 
types of training. 
Ongoing learning is important in this 
setting because changes regularly occur in 
service 
offerings, work processes, and infor 
mation 
systems. For example, in our survey 
of supervisors, they reported that operators 
received an average of 6.7 emails per day 
on 
updates or new procedures. They also 
reported that service options, features, and 
pricing were updated "sometimes" to "often" 
(2.5 on a Likert scale of 1-5). Just prior to 
our fieldwork, the company had shifted to 
providing National 411 service (as opposed 
to 
regional service only), which was an im 
portant source of new revenues, but which 
required operators to learn an entire new da 
tabase system. The efficient handling of calls 
depends not only on technical procedural 
knowledge but also on whether the operator 
has tacit knowledge of local terminology or 
names of businesses that diverge from how 
they are officially listed in information data 
bases. In sum, in what is often considered 
a 
relatively low-skilled clerical job, there are 
ongoing changes in information systems and 
work processes that require regular attention 
to informal training. 
Variation in training practices in this study 
derives largely from variation in managerial 
implementation of corporate policies. For 
example, the company set a policy that all 
supervisors must observe at least 70% of their 
employees each month, yet in one site we 
visited, the manager admitted that they were 
only observing 36%. Thus, managers varied 
substantially in whether they achieved that 
goal, depending on staffing levels, resources, 
or their own 
managerial competence. In ad 
dition, these managers had some discretion 
over their operational budgets: in our field 
interviews, for example, we found that manag 
ers differed in the amount of resources they 
decided to put into ongoing training. 
The employee sample was drawn from 
the 
company's Human Resource Informa 
tion (HRJ) system, which contained data on 
demographics (age, race, gender, company 
tenure) Job title, work group location, super 
visor, work site location, and wage rate. We 
excluded 194 employees who had less than 
six months of 
employment because they were 
not rated 
using the same scale as employees 
beyond the six-month probation. We also 
excluded centers with fewer than 40 employ 
ees. The sample included 3,408 telephone 
operators, but randomly missing data reduced 
the sample used in the multivariate analyses 
to 2,803 workers at 45 service centers. 
Operators in our sample are primarily 
white (71%) and female (86%), with an av 
erage age of 41 and company tenure of 11 
years (as shown in Table 1). The company 
hires high school graduates and uses two 
rounds of systematic testing in its selection 
procedures. While the HRJ system did not 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variables 
Total Sample Final Sample 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-Value 
Call Handling Time 
(seconds per call) 2,929 
Informal Training 
(hours per month) 17,040 
with Supervisors 17,040 
with Peers 17,040 
Age (years) 3,369 
Company Tenure (years) 3,408 
Sex, Dummy (1 = female) 3,408 
Race, Dummy (1 = non-white) 3,408 
21.67 
1.25 
0.98 
0.27 
40.80 
11.42 
0.87 
0.28 
4.46 
1.43 
1.17 
0.80 
11.25 
10.16 
0.34 
0.45 
2,803 
11,701 
11,701 
11,701 
2,765 
2,803 
2,803 
2,803 
21.67 
1.34 
1.03 
0.31 
40.67 
11.28 
0.86 
0.29 
4.24 
1.40 
1.10 
0.86 
11.21 
10.15 
0.35 
0.45 
0.02 
-5.38 
-3.52 
-4.37 
0.46 
0.54 
0.70 
-0.89 
provide educational data, our survey of em 
ployees showed that most have had some 
post-secondary education, but only 8% have 
a four-year college degree. The average 
supervisor in the sample is 44 years old and 
has served the company for about 20 years; 
the average peer trainer is 50 years old and 
has served for 22 years. Seventy-six percent 
of supervisors are white and 83% of them are 
female, while 78% of peer trainers are white 
and 94% female. 
Measures 
Measures of training and productivity 
come from the computerized monitoring 
system in the call centers, which continuously 
records the work activities of each operator, 
including time on-line with customers and 
off-line for training or other activities. The 
monthly data in this study cover the period 
January 2001 through May 2001. Each time an 
employee logged off the computer for train 
ing, the minutes of training were recorded, 
along with whether the training was with a 
supervisor or peer trainer. Informal training 
is the length of time a worker spent in infor 
mal training each month. Average training 
per month ranged from 75 to 94 minutes. 
When the data are broken down by type of 
trainer, they show that workers received 
an 
average of 62 minutes of informal training 
with their supervisors and 19 minutes with 
peer trainers each month. 
Recall that our measure of productivity 
is CHT, the average number of seconds an 
Operator spends on a customer call; and 
lower call handling time equals higher 
productivity. To measure pre-training pro 
ficiency, we used an operator's percentage 
of objectives met (PCT_CHT) in the first 
month for which we had data (for example, 
January). Because the customer base varies 
geographically, each center specifies its own 
objectives, setting the minimum require 
ments 
expected from a worker performing 
at a normal pace. PCT_CHT is defined 
as the objective set by the center for call 
handling time divided by the actual time 
spent handling a call. Thus, an employee 
who handles a call in under the time that is 
set as the center's 
objective achieves a score 
higher than 100% on the "objectives met" 
criterion. The company set the range of 
acceptable performance between 94% and 
107%. Any operators who fell below 94% 
were rated 
unsatisfactory, and above 107%, 
excellent. We chose this measure instead 
of CHT to eliminate the potential for er 
ror 
arising from unobserved, confounding 
establishment characteristics. Using the 
company's threshold criteria of 94% and 
107%, we established three proficiency 
categories: low (506 workers, 29% of the 
total); average (674 workers, 39%); and 
high (555 workers, 32%). 
Finally, we matched the training and 
productivity data to archival data from the 
company's HRI system. Through our first 
difference model, we controlled for age, sex, 
race, company tenure, and other worker 
characteristics that are time-invariant. 
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Selection Bias 
Prior literature suggests that non-random 
selection into training may seriously bias 
the estimation of returns to training (for 
example, Bartel 1995). In this study, we 
used longitudinal data and first-difference 
models that reduce the errors associated 
with self-selection into training. In addi 
tion, we performed a number of analyses 
to assess the extent of selection bias in the 
data. First, we found that the distribu 
tion of training is widespread: over the 
five months of data, only 2 workers out of 
3,408 received no training. These cases 
were not part of our final sample of 2,803 
workers. On a 
month-by-month basis, the 
percentage of workers who received some 
training ranged from 92.8% to 95.6%. We 
ran a random effects probit analysis to test 
whether performance in month 1 was a 
predictor of whether an employee received 
any training in a given month, and we found 
no 
statistically significant effect. 
We then assessed variation in hours of 
training received and found statistically sig 
nificant differences by proficiency level, thus 
confirming the need to take job proficiency 
into consideration. The lowest proficiency 
group received an average of 1 hour and 44 
minutes (SD = 1.54) of informal training each 
month, while the average proficiency group 
received 1 hour and 28 minutes (SD = 1.53), 
and the high proficiency group, 1 hour and 19 
minutes (SD = 1.33). In regressions control 
ling for supervisor and worker demographic 
characteristics, the average proficiency 
group received a total of 1.25 hours less 
training over five months (16 minutes per 
month) than did the low proficiency group, 
and the high proficiency group received a 
total of 1.55 hours less (18.6 minutes per 
month) (see Appendix 1). While these 
differences are statistically significant, they 
appear to be modest in magnitude. Histo 
grams of the distribution of training hours 
within each proficiency group also showed 
a narrow 
range of variability. In addition, 
the relative proportion of training provided 
by peers versus supervisors was similar for 
each group: supervisor training represented 
71% of all training for the low proficiency 
Table 2. Relationship between 
Training and Job Performance: First 
Difference Nonlinear Least Squares. 
Dependent Variable: 
Independent Variable Call Handling Time 
Informal Training -0.006*** 
(-7.40) 
Depreciation Rate 0.038** 
(2.08) 
No. of Observations 8,898 
No. of 
Persons_2,803 
Notes: 
T-statistics are in parentheses below the parameter 
estimates. 
Informal training, as measured by hours per month, 
and call handling time, as measured by seconds per call, 
were transformed into logarithms. 
The estimated depreciation rate was almost 0. Impos 
ing this value, which allows fixed-effects estimates of a 
linear model, produced parameter estimates that were 
almost identical to those listed here. 
**Statistically significant at the .05 level; ***at the 
.01 level (two-tailed tests). 
group, 78% for the average proficiency 
group, and 73% for the high proficiency 
group. In sum, these analyses show that 
there is a relatively even distribution of 
informal training in our sample, which is 
consistent with findings in national surveys 
(Altonji and Spletzer 1991). 
Results 
Training and Productivity 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating 
equation (5)?the relationship between train 
ing and call handling time among all workers 
using first-difference non-linear least squares 
models.1 Informal training has a strong 
negative effect on call handling time (a posi 
tive effect on productivity). For an average 
worker, a 10% increase in informal training 
(0.13 hours) is associated with a 0.06% reduc 
tion in call handling time (0.013 seconds) (p 
< 0.01), with a monthly depreciation rate of 
3.8% (p < 0.05). In terms of absolute value, 
*In Table 2 and subsequent analyses, we constrained 
the parameter space of the depreciation rate (n) to 
values between zero and one. 
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Table 3. Relationship between Training and Job Performance: Fixed Effects Estimation. 
Dependent Variable: Call Handling Time 
Workers of Low Workers of Average Workers of High 
Independent Variable Pre-Training Proficiency Pre-Training Proficiency Pre-Training Proficiency 
Informal Training -0.016*** -0.006*** -0.003*** 
(-15.47) (-9.48) (-3.80) 
No. of Observations 3,225 4,651 3,825 
No. of 
Persons_754_1,152_897_ 
Notes: 
T-statistics are in parentheses below the parameter estimates. 
Informal training, as measured by hours per month, and call handling time, as measured by seconds per call, 
were transformed into logarithms. 
The analyses included a total of 2,803 workers. 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level (two-tailed test). 
an additional hour of informal training is 
associated with a reduction of 0.10 seconds 
in call handling time in the current month. 
The results support the argument that the 
amount of time spent in informal training 
leads to productivity improvements in the 
contemporaneous period and that such an 
effect diminishes over time. 
To provide a more accurate estimate of 
the returns to training, we took into account 
differences associated with pre-training pro 
ficiency. When we tested the relationship 
between informal training and productivity 
across low, average, and high pre-training 
proficiency groups, the estimated deprecia 
tion rate (r\) we found was very close to zero. 
In this case, equation (5) is reduced to a 
fixed effects model that can be estimated by 
ordinary least squares.2 As shown in Table 3, 
workers with lower proficiency demonstrated 
substantially higher performance gains re 
lated to training than did those with higher 
levels of proficiency. For workers in the low 
proficiency group, a 10% increase in informal 
training is associated with a 0.16% reduction 
in call handling time (p < 0.01). The same 
amount of change in training is associated 
with a 0.06% reduction in call handling time 
for workers in the average proficiency group 
(p < 0.01), and 0.03% reduction in the high 
HTie reduced form: 
InPERF 
=?*ln(2 0/T..)+|i. + v.#. 
proficiency group (p < 0.01 ). In other words, 
an additional hour of informal training leads 
to a reduction of 0.260 seconds in call han 
dling time for the lowest-proficiency group, 
a reduction of 0.099 seconds for the average 
proficiency group, and a reduction of only 
0.045 seconds for the highest proficiency 
group. Taken together, these analyses show the 
differential outcomes of training according to 
the proficiency level of the worker. 
Supervisor versus Peer Training 
Next we examine how variation in the type 
of training provider ( supervisor versus peer) 
interacts with workers' proficiency levels. 
As we assume a logarithmic specification 
between training and performance, workers 
who received only supervisor-provided train 
ing or peer-provided training are regarded as 
missing and thus are dropped from the analy 
ses. In other words, the following analyses 
only include the 1,735 workers who received 
both types of training. Table 4 reports these 
results.3 For all workers who received train 
ing with a supervisor, call handling time is 
significantly reduced (-0.005, p < 0.01); and 
for those who received training with peers, 
call handling time is also significantly re 
duced (-0.003, p < 0.01). If we translate the 
logarithms into absolute values, the results 
indicate that a 10% reduction in call handling 
time is associated with either 2.12 hours of 
training provided by supervisors or 2.13 hours 
of training provided by peers. 
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Table 4. Relationship between Supervisor Training, 
Peer Training, and Job Performance: Fixed Effects Estimation. 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Call Handling Time 
All Workers 
Workers of Low 
Pre-Training 
Proficiency 
Workers of Average 
Pre-Training 
Proficiency 
Workers of High 
Pre-Training 
Proficiency 
Supervisor Informal Training 
Peer Informal Training 
No. of Observations 
No. of Persons 
-0.005*** 
(-4.83) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.44) 
5,708 
1,735 
-0.010*** 
(-4.75) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.83) 
1,695 
506 
-0.004*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.004** 
(-2.12) 
2,261 
674 
-0.003* 
(-1.77) 
0.005** 
(2.06) 
1,752 
555 
Notes: 
T-statistics are in parentheses below the parameter estimates. 
Informal training, as measured by hours per month, and call handling time, as measured by seconds per call, 
were transformed into logarithms. 
* 
Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level (two-tailed tests). 
However, this level of aggregation masks 
differences by level of proficiency. For 
workers in the low proficiency group, a 10% 
increase in 
supervisor training is associated 
with a 0.1% reduction in call handling time 
(p < 0.01), and a 10% increase in peer train 
ing is associated with a 0.06 reduction in call 
handling time (p<0.01). In other words, the 
call handling time of a less proficient worker 
who receives 1.12 hours of supervisor train 
ing or 1.36 hours of peer training will fall by 
10% (0.024 seconds). The results support 
the idea that less proficient workers realize 
greater performance improvements from 
supervisor training than from peer training, 
presumably because it is more structured and 
extrinsically motivated than peer training. 
We also found that supervisor training 
and peer-provided training reduced the call 
handling time for workers in the average 
proficiency group. Although the estimates of 
the coefficients are close in value (both are 
-0.004, p < 0.01 and p < 0.05 respectively), 
we need to take into account that 
supervi 
sor training and peer-provided training 
differ in magnitude. In particular, a typical 
worker in this group received 1.03 hours of 
supervisor-provided training and 0.27 hours 
of peer-provided training every month. In 
order to reduce call handling time by 10% 
(0.021 seconds), a worker in this group 
would have needed to receive 2.7 hours of 
Supervisor training, but only 1.4 hours of 
peer-provided training. Therefore, work 
ers in the average proficiency group gained 
more from peer trainers than they did from 
supervisors because they reached the same 
productivity gains from learning with peers 
in less time. Moreover, the company gained 
added economic benefits from using peer 
trainers because their labor costs (wages) 
were lower than those of 
supervisors. 
Finally, while investments in training 
generate the least benefits to workers with 
high levels of competence, as suggested by 
the interaction term in Table 3, we find that 
supervisor training is beneficial for these 
workers at a 
marginal level of significance 
(-0.003, p < 0.10); but training delivered 
by peers is negatively related to productivity 
(0.005, p < 0.05). These results are contrary 
to our 
expectations, and we discuss them 
below. 
Calculating the Returns 
on Investments in Training 
Shaving fractions of seconds off phone calls 
may appear to have a very modest effect on 
productivity. However, in call centers that 
manage millions of transactions in a typical 
year, these small efficiency improvements 
translate into millions of dollars in 
savings. 
To assess the costs and benefits of training in 
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Table 5. Rates of Return to Training. 
Description All Workers 
Workers of 
Low 
Pre-Training 
Proficiency 
Workers of Workers of 
Average High 
Pre-Training Pre-Training 
Proficiency Profidency 
Call Handling Time Prior to Training (seconds) 21.67 24.36 21.56 18.49 
Informal Training Received (hours) 1.34 1.50 1.31 1.24 
Reduction in Call Handling Time Associated with 
One Additional Hour of Training (seconds) 0.097 0.260 0.099 0.045 
ROI 489.8% 1,305.1% 503.3% 218.7% 
Note: A monthly loss rate (skill depreciation and turnover) of 4.3% is assumed in ROI calculations. 
this case, we calculated the return on invest 
ment by using employee wage records and 
the estimated coefficients of training on call 
handling time, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
Unlike Bishop (1991) who only accounted 
for the training time of trainers, we also take 
into account the training time of workers. 
Average monthly earnings for telephone 
operators, service assistants, and supervisors 
were $2,764, $3,318, and $4,944, respectively. 
As supervisors provided 78% of total train 
ing, the Weighted monthly wages of trainers 
were $4,580. Total work time was 150.5 hours 
each month. Our analysis suggested that a 
one-hour change in informal training was 
associated with a 0.097-second reduction in 
time per call for an average worker. When 
we take pre-training job competency into 
account, this translates to a reduction of 
0.260 seconds for workers with low initial 
competency, 0.099 seconds for those with 
average proficiency, and 0.045 seconds for 
those with high competency. 
In addition to skill depreciation, it would 
be more accurate to take into account, as 
well, the effects of employee turnover, which 
is likely to lead to a loss of human capital. 
Company archives indicated that the quit rate 
was less than 5% each year. The estimated 
depreciation rate in the data is 3.8% each 
month. To be conservative, we assume a 
monthly quit rate of 0.5%, or 6% per year. 
This results in a loss rate of 4.3% each month. 
We calculated rates of return for workers in 
each group of initial competency based on 
the above information. The results are shown 
in Table 5. The first column reports the ROI 
for all workers in the sample. The returns to 
company investments for informal training 
are quite high?489.8%. To illustrate the non 
linearity between training and productivity, 
columns (2), (3), and (4) report the returns 
of a worker whose initial job competency was 
low, average, and high, respectively, and who 
received the average amount of training in 
her proficiency group. 
Discussion 
This study focused on the relationship 
between informal training and productivity 
among incumbent telephone operators in a 
large unionized telecommunications com 
pany. Using objective data from company ar 
chives and a first-difference model to control 
for worker heterogeneity, our analyses pro 
duced three major findings. First, we found 
a statistically significant positive relationship 
between investments in informal training and 
productivity; and the benefits of training were 
sustained over several months. Because we 
use objective data and our specification takes 
into account the stock and flow of training 
investments, as well as the depreciation of 
learning, we have been able to provide an 
estimation of the returns to training that is 
more fine-grained than similar estimates in 
prior studies. 
Second, our results indicate that individual 
differences, as measured by pre-training pro 
ficiency, need to be incorporated into evalu 
ations of training effectiveness, both because 
they affect the returns to training and because 
they interact with the type of training offered. 
The relationship between training and per 
formance was strongest for workers in the less 
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proficient group, less pronounced for those 
in the average proficiency group, and weak 
est for those in the high proficiency group, 
suggesting that information processing and 
self-regulatory mechanisms are different 
among workers with different levels of initial 
job competence. In addition, workers in the 
less proficient group who received training 
benefited more from training with supervi 
sors than with peers. The opposite was true 
for workers in the average proficiency group. 
This difference is understandable, as supervi 
sors tend to provide structured training on 
basic procedures while peer trainers draw on 
their tacit knowledge of idiosyncratic work 
processes to enhance the existing knowledge 
of experienced workers. These findings are 
consistent with the literature on situated 
learning, which suggests that learning on 
the job depends not only on the attributes 
of individuals, but also on the interactions 
among employees at work. 
Contrary to expectations, however, we 
found that for the high proficiency group, 
supervisor training was marginally effective, 
but peer-provided training lowered pro 
ductivity. One possible explanation is that 
the high proficiency peers simply used the 
"training" time to socialize. Alternatively, 
they may have used the time to experiment 
with new work methods that, while lowering 
productivity, improved other outcomes, such 
as customer satisfaction or quality, which are 
not measured in this 
study. 
Finally, this quantitative case study dem 
onstrates that 
companies may recoup their 
investments in training, even in settings 
characterized by highly routinized work. 
The return on training investment for this 
sample of telephone operators was 489.8% 
for all workers. AsKusterer (1978) noted, no 
job is literally unskilled, and all jobs require 
the acquisition of a substantial amount of 
working knowledge in job-specific domains. 
Informal training is an effective tool for 
upgrading the skills and job competence of 
high-school-educated workers. Moreover, 
in contrast to formal training, which tends 
to be concentrated among young, well-edu 
cated, professional or managerial employees, 
or those in large establishments, informal 
training is widespread, and the likelihood 
of its receipt seems to be little influenced by 
worker characteristics such as sex, race, or 
even formal education (Altonji and Spletzer 
1991). Therefore, it provides a valuable 
learning opportunity for workers who do 
not go on to college or who cannot afford 
to devote a lengthy amount of time to cer 
tificated programs. 
This study does have several limitations. 
First, to deal with the issue of selection bias, 
we examined the association between worker 
characteristics and informal training, and 
found that workers who received lower per 
formance 
ratings received greater amounts of 
informal training. To reduce the magnitude 
of this problem, we disaggregated the data 
and estimated separate models for work 
ers with different pre-training proficiency 
levels. We also used first-difference models 
of estimation. These 
strategies alleviate, 
but do not completely solve, the selection 
problem. Second, we do not allow for time 
variant individual heterogeneity in this 
study. Nevertheless, the results suggest that 
our models explain more than 94% of total 
variance. Third, we examine only proximal 
productivity outcomes. While labor efficiency 
is clearly a high priority in this commodity 
production setting, managers were also con 
cerned about customer satisfaction 
ratings 
and 
employee behaviors such as absenteeism. 
In such routinizedjobs, time off the phone 
for training is viewed as a benefit, with mo 
tivational results that may reduce emotional 
exhaustion or burnout and absenteeism, and 
in turn generate better service by employees 
or additional cost 
savings. 
Finally, the important policy question 
is, "So what?" The present study examines 
a setting in which work tasks have been 
increasingly automated and employment 
levels have fallen steadily over the past 50 
years. However, employers still need to maxi 
mize the productivity of existing processes 
even as they continue to seek new levels of 
efficiency through automation; and with 
ongoing changes in software technology 
and information systems, employees need 
ongoing training to adjust to those changes. 
In addition, as Levy and Murnane (2004) 
and others have demonstrated, the jobs left 
behind are typically more complex than 
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those that have been automated, requiring 
higher skills and job-specific training. If 
this study is viewed as a critical test?focus 
ing on a setting in which the pay-offs to 
training are not likely to be found?then 
we believe the findings may generalize to 
a broader set of employees whose skills re 
quire regular on-the-job upgrading due to 
ongoing changes in products, marketing, 
work processes, and technologies. A large 
proportion of U.S. workplaces fall into 
this category; and compared to directory 
assistance services, they involve jobs that 
offer employees greater opportunity and 
discretion to use their skills and knowledge. 
In these contexts, the pay-off to systematic 
informal training should be greater than 
that found in our study. 
Variable 
Appendix 1 
Total Training Hours Received in Five Months as a Function of Worker Characteristics 
Coeffident P > l/l 
Pre-Training Proficiency, Dummy (1 = average) 
Pre-Training Proficiency, Dummy (1 = high) 
Age (years) 
Organizational Tenure (years) 
Sex, Dummy (1 = female) 
Race, Dummy (1 = non-white) 
Constant 
R-Squared 
Adjusted R-Squared 
-1.248 
-1.550 
-0.003 
-0.017 
-0.067 
0.341 
7.688 
0.4835 
0.4723 
0.00 
0.00 
0.68 
0.04 
0.68 
0.04 
Note: Work units (39 in total) were considered as dummy variables in the regression. 
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